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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
RENNOLD PENDER, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
S. W. DOWSE and PEARL DOWSE, 
his wife, JAY E. TREADWAY and 
MARION MAVE TREADWAY, his 
wife, and A. C. WHITAKER, 
Defendants and Appellants, 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
This is a case in which the District Court set aside an 
execution sale and sheriff's deed issued to appellant 
Dowse, a deed from appellant Dowse to appellants Tread-
way, and a mortgage to appellant A. C. Whitaker. The 
deed and mortgage covered a part of the property in-
volved in this action. The sheriff's deed, the deed to 
Case No, 
7949 
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Treadways and the mortgage to Whitaker were vacated 
because the sheriff's sale was made upon a satisfied 
judgment and neither Treadway nor Whitaker were in-
nocent purchasers. The trial court also found the execu-
tion sale was for a grossly inadequate price, that the 
sale was attended by fraud, conspiracy, irregularities, 
and that it was unfair. The court rendered a money 
judgment against appellant Dowse for rents and profits 
received from the properties sold at execution and for 
slander of title. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The respondent accepts the statement of facts as 
set forth by appellant Dowse with the following 
additions and amplifications: 
A cost judgment was entered by Dowse in Civil 
Case No. 86,895 (Ex. 1) in violation of an unaorstanding 
between respondent's attorney, Milton V. Backman, and 
LaMar Duncan, attorney for Dowse. In line with this 
understanding Mr. Backman paid no heed to the pro-
visions of the Findings and Decree providing for costs 
in case No. 86,895, and the cost bill did not come to his 
personal attention when served on his office, (R 91). 
Subsequent to the entry of the cost judgment, Mr. 
Duncan approached Mr. Backman for the purpose of 
working out an arrangement for terminating respond-
ent's right of appeal and settling the differences 
existing between the parties in case No. 86,895 (R 63, 
64, 65, 67, 68 & 180) (Finding No. 7). An understanding 
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was reached, Mr. Dowse agreeing to give Mr. Pender 
$100.00 for a quit-claim deed to the property, the subject 
of litigation in case No. 86,895. The $100.00 was paid 
and the deed was delivered by respondent to appellant 
on January 29, 1949, (E 65, 189) (Ex. J ) . Nothing 
was said about the cost judgment during the negotia-
tions, nor at the time of the payment of the $100.00 for 
the delivery of the deed (E 189). Mr. Duncan, Dowse's 
attorney, who personally delivered the $100.00 in 
consideration of the delivery of the deed, made no 
demand for payment of the $22.80 cost judgment, nor 
did he claim a right to withhold the sum of $22.80 to 
satisfy the cost judgment (E 189, 190). 
The execution dated January 9, 1949 was not 
delivered to the sheriff for service until January 31, 
1951, when Mr, Duncan delivered it to the sheriff to-
gether with the Praecipe (E. 137, 139.) (Ex. H, X). 
The praecipe directed the sheriff to levy upon the 
property in question together with the other real 
property, the latter property referred to being struck 
from the sale when Mr. Bleak, the deputy sheriff, 
informed Mr. Duncan there was a question as to the 
ownership (E 138). 
The date the execution and praecipe issued and 
at the time of the levy and sale appellant Dowse had 
in his possession personal property belonging to Mr. 
Pender of a value of more than sufficient to satisfy the 
judgment, (E. 108, 136, Finding No. 10). 
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Prior to the sale and the issuance of the sheriff's 
deed the respondent had had many business transactions 
with appellant Dowse and respondent had consum-
mated the deals by checks drawn on the First Security 
Bank of Utah (E. 104, 105) (Ex. N), the last check being 
dated June 17, 1949. Eespondent had bank accounts 
in three Salt Lake City banks, viz: $1,000.00 in the 
Continental National Bank; $100.00 in First Security 
Bank of Utah, N. A. and $500 in Walker Bank & Trust 
Company (E. 105,106,115). 
Prior to the delivery of the praecipe appellant told 
Mr. Duncan, his attorney, that respondent had kept 
accounts in several Salt Lake City banks (E 185). 
The respondent owned an automobile in which 
appellant Dowse had ridden several times (E. 106), 
and both appellant and his attorney knew respondent 
owned such (E. 106). 
Situated on part of the property levied upon, (not 
the property mortgaged or deeded to appellants Tread-
way and Whitaker) was a garage containing war sur-
plus materials. In addition there was visible on the 
property, a walk-in refrigerator and a large stack of 
automobile mufflers. The mufflers were contained in 
boxes stacked 15 feet high, 75 feet long and 18 feet wide 
(E. I l l , 112, 120 and 121). This personal property had 
stood on the property levied upon since 1948 or 1949, and 
several of the following signs were tacked thereon: 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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"FOR SALE 
Call or Write 
R. PENDER, Owner 
672 Milton Ave. Phone 6-2346" 
(R. 121, 122). The sign was approximately 13" x 
20" (R. 112, 113, 121) (Ex. Q). The signs could be seen 
from Richards Street and also at South Temple and 
13th South Streets (R. 112, 113, 123). This personal 
property was at all times in full view (R 114, 115). 
The respondent valued this personal property at 
from $1,000.00 to $2,000.00. Another witness, Mr. 
Larch, valued it at execution from $2,000.00 to $5,000.00 
(R 113, 125). Appellants did not question the value 
placed thereon. Exhibits R, S, T, U, V, and O are 
pictures of the personal property situated on the real 
property aforementioned. 
Prior to the execution and issuance of the praecipe, 
the levy and sale, appellant Dowse examined the 
property, the subject of this action, and saw the personal 
property located thereon, (R 129, 130 and 131). Appel-
lant knew it belonged to respondent. Respondent had 
taken appellant to the property and had shown it to 
him (R. 134). Mr. Duncan also knew of the personal 
property on the premises as he examined the property 
prior to the issuance of the praecipe and prior to the 
sale (R. 183,197,198). 
Appellant Dowse never told the sheriff or his depu-
ties that the respondent owned personal property (R. 
131). 
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No attempt was made by Dowse to collect the 
judgment by garnishment proceedings (R 131, 190). 
Neither did Dowse examine respondent on supplemental 
proceedings (R. 132). 
The property sold consisted of four non-contiguous 
tracts of land situated in North Columbia Subdivision, 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, of the fair market 
value at the date of the execution sale as hereinafter 
mentioned and subject to the following encumbrances: 
Lots 2, 3 and 4, Block 8—Value $6,000.00, less 
Freeman judgment of $13.20 and a tax sale of 
$171.86, or a net value of $5,814.94 (R 78, 79) 
(Ex. F) . 
Lots 2 and 3, Block 4—Value $1,080.00, less the 
same Freeman judgment of $13.20, or a net value 
of $1,066.81 (R 81, Ex. D). 
Lots 6 and 7, Block 4—Value $875.00, less the 
same Freeman judgment of $13.20; special tax 
sale for paving extension of $35.15, costs and 
interest; tax sale to Salt Lake County for the 
years 1929 to 1935, approximately $240.00 plus 
interest and costs. A tax deed had issued to Salt 
Lake County, net value of approximately $606.65. 
^ v (R 80, Ex. E) . 
Lots 1, 19 and 20, Block 6—Value $900.00, less 
the same Freeman judgment of $13.20, or a net 
value of $886.80 (R 81, 82. Ex. B). 
Lots 13 to 21, Block 8, are contiguous to Lots 1, 
19 and 20, Block 6. Title to Lots 13 to 21, Block 
8, had been quieted subject to respondent paying 
Carl Morandi the sum of $3,086.44 ( E x / C ) . 
These lots were valued at $12.00 per foot. A 
total value of this tract of land was $3600.00 less 
the Morandi claim in the sum of $3,086.44. The 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
7 
Morandi claim however included other property-f^ ^ Q -
not covered by this action. 
Appellant Mr. Dowse, a real estate broker for 24 
years, did not question the foregoing values. Neither 
did appellants Treadway or Whitaker show that the 
property was of a lesser value. 
No demand was made by appellant Dowse or his 
attorney Mr. Duncan for the payment of the judgment 
(K 189), nor did they advise the respondent or his 
attorney that the property was being levied upon and 
was being sold or that it had been sold. This was true 
notwithstanding the fact that the respondent and the 
appellant Dowse and their attorneys are all residents 
of Salt Lake City, Utah, and Mr. Dowse and the 
respondent had business dealings together, both before 
"
l
 and after the entry of the judgment, Dowse was respon-
dent's broker (R. 34), and Mr. Duncan and Mr. Back-
man had met each other several times on the street 
(R 67). Mr. Duncan explained his failure to notify Mr. 
Backman or to make a demand for the payment of the 
judgment was because he was angry with Mr. Backman 
as Mr. Backman would not get him a quit-claim deed 
without cost (R, 189). 
Mr. Dowse and Mr. Duncan directed the sheriff 
to levy on the respondent's real property, knowing that ' 
there was personal property from which any valid judg-
ment could be satisfied. 
The sheriff made no effort to locate and sell 
respondent's non-exempt personal property (R 141), 
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and this notwithstanding as heretofore shown, personal 
property belonging to respondent was situated on the 
property upon which Mr. Bleak, the deputy sheriff, post-
ed a notice (B. 143), and signs indicating ownership in 
the respondent were attached to the property (E. 121). 
The real property, the subject of this action, worth 
approximately $8,000.00 exclusive of taxes and other 
liens was sold to the appellant Dowse at execution sale 
for $47.46 (Ex. I) . 
Neither respondent or his attorney, Mr. Backman, 
had actual knowledge of the levy, the sale or the 
sheriff's deed until after the deed had been issued (E 67, 
68, 52) (Finding No. 14). 
Eespondent paid the Morandi claim of $3086.44 (E. 
174). 
Eespondent alleged in his amended complaint 
that he did not tender the amount of the judgment, 
interest and costs and the costs incurred by reason of 
the sheriff's sale for the reason that the sale was unlaw-
ful as it was upon a satisfied judgment, however, he 
offered to pay such amount provided the court should 
find that the judgment had not been satisfied (E 28). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS AS THEY APPLY 
TO APPELLANTS TEEADWAY 
Eespondent accepts the statement of facts of the 
appellants Treadway with the following additions and 
amplifications: 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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The certificate of sale and the sheriff's deed were of 
record in the office of the County Recorder of Salt Lake 
County prior to the sale to Treadways. Each of said 
instruments recited the purchase price for the whole 
of the property acquired by appellant Dowse at sheriff's 
sale of $47.46. The abstract contained the execution, the 
certificate of sale and the sheriff's deed (Ex. 4). 
Counsel for Treadways, being concerned about the 
regularity of the sheriff's sale, made inquiry of Mr. Dun-
can, attorney for appellant Dowse regarding the proceed-
ings. Thereafter appellant Dowse delivered a special 
warranty deed to Treadways and not a general warranty 
deed which Dowse had agreed to deliver to Treadways. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS AS THEY APPLY 
TO APPELLANT WHITAKER 
The respondent accepts the statement of facts as 
outlined in brief of appellant Whitaker, with the excep-
tions, additions and amplifications herein noted. 
Appellant Whitaker's testimony to the effect that in 
accepting a mortgage he did so in reliance on a title in-
surance policy was admitted by the court for the sole 
purpose of showing that he did not have actual knowledge 
of the execution, sheriff's certificate of sale and deed 
(R. 160). 
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Appellants Whitaker and Dowse had been friends 
for 25 years; they officed within seven or eight doors of 
each other and Dowse visited with Whitaker at Whit-
aker 's place of business once or more each week (E. 162, 
165). 
Whitaker's mortgage covered only three of the 19 
lots sold to Dowse at sheriff's sale, he did not inspect the 
property prior to the execution of the mortgage, how-
ever, he said he knew of it and that Dowse had described 
its location to him (E. 166). 
Prior to the execution of the mortgage Whitaker 
had taken property in his name for the benefit of himself 
and Dowse and at the time of the execution of the mort-
gage and the date of its foreclosure, Dowse and Whitaker 
were the co-owners of four tracts of land (E. 163, 167, 
168). 
Some time prior to the mortgage transaction, Dowse 
had shown Whitaker a $10,000.00 title policy covering 
the 19 lots in question and Whitaker asked for a title 
insurance policy to the three lots covered by the mort-
gage (E. 170,171, Ex. 9). 
The $5,000.00 promissory note was payable two years 
after date with interest payable semi-annually. Dowse 
defaulted in the payment of the first two semi-annual 
interest payments and yet no demand was made for pay-
ment of either of them until March, 1952, which was after 
the commencement of this action. Thereafter Whitaker 
foreclosed the mortgage (E. 160). 
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PRETRIAL ORDER 
The appellant Dowse set forth part of the pretrial 
order only. In addition to his statement the following 
amendment should be included: (R 47 and 54) 
"On motion of counsellor plaintiff and good 
cause appearing, the pretrial order heretofore 
entered in this case is amended by adding as 
ISSUES OF LAW the following: 
1. May a court of equity set aside the 
Sheriff's Deed affecting the property in question 
and impose a trust on the property in favor of 
plaintiff. 
2. Are the defendants Treadway innocent 
purchasers for value or did they take subject to 
any right, title or interest plaintiff has in the 
property. 
3. Was the defendant Whittaker an inno-
cent mortgagee for value or did he take subject 
to plaintiff's title. 
4. Provided the court should find that 
defendants Treadway are innocent purchasers for 
value, is plaintiff entitled to judgment against 
defendant S. W. Dowse for the sum- of $1000.00 
paid by Treadways for a portion of said property 
or its fair market value. 
5. Provided the court should find that 
defendant Whittaker's mortgage is not subject 
to plaintiff's title, is the plaintiff entitled to 
judgment against S. W. Dowse in the amount 
represented by the lien of the mortgage. 
6. Is plaintiff entitled to damages against 
S. W. Dowse for slander of title and if so in what 
amount." 
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ARGUMENT 
A SUIT IN EQUITY TO SET ASIDE AN 
EXECUTION SALE AND SHERIFF'S DEED PUR-
SUANT THERETO AND THE DEED OF INTEE-
VENING THIED PAETIES IS PEOPEE AND MAY 
BE MAINTAINED AND A JUDGMENT DEBTOE 
NEED NOT PROCEED IN THE OEIGINAL ACTION 
OUT OF WHICH THE SALE AROSE WHERE 
SHEEIFF'S DEED HAS ISSUED OE THE PEOP-
EETY IS DEEDED OE MOETGAGED TO OTHEES 
OE WHEEE THE SALE IS ATTENDED WITH 
FEAUD, OE AN ACCOUNTING IS NECESSARY 
TO ADJUST THE EIGHTS OF THE PAETIES. 
The Appellants contend that the Respondent's 
action does not lie in equity that he should have pro-
ceeded in the original action out of which the execution, 
sale and sheriff's deed resulted. He characterizes 
respondent's suit in equity as a collateral attack. In 
no respect is their position correct. The Courts uni-
formly hold where a sheriff's deed has issued, or the 
rights of a third party intervened, or an accounting is 
necessary to adjust the rights of the parties, or the sale 
is attended with fraud that the proper remedy is by 
a suit in equity, the remedy at law is inadequate, the 
law Court not having the authority to vacate or set 
aside the sheriff's deed or the deeds of third parties or 
render an accounting and a suit in equity is proper and 
is a direct attack upon the sale and deeds and not 
collateral. 
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Not one, but all of the elements conferring equity 
jurisdiction are present here. The sheriff's deed had 
issued, there are intervening third parties, the sale was 
attended with fraud and an accounting of rents, profits 
and taxes was necessary. 
"A bill in equity, however, may be main-
tained for this purpose where proper grounds 
for equity jurisdiction exist, and where the 
remedy at law by motion to vacate the sale, or 
by ejectment or defense thereto, is inadequate. 
Thus a bill in equity is the proper remedy where 
the questions involved are such that they cannot 
be as satisfactorily investigated on the hearing 
of the motion as on the trial of a suit in equity, 
as in cases where it may be necessary to execute 
long delay in attacking the sale, or where there 
may be one who may possibly claim to be an 
innocent purchaser; or where the purchaser has 
rightfully paid out considerable sums which 
should be refunded or secured to him if the sale 
is vacated; or where the property has been con-
veyed by the purchaser at the sale to a third 
person; or where the purchaser is not a party 
to the action; or after the time for a motion has 
expired. 
"Before or after execution of deed. While 
as shown supra pp. 238 b, there are decisions 
authorizing a motion to set aside the sale after 
the execution of a sheriff's deed; it is generally 
held that equity has exclusive jurisdiction of a 
bill to set aside a sale where the sale has been 
followed by a deed from the sheriff, since a court 
of law is incompetent to decree the cancellation 
of such deed and thus remove the cloud it casts 
on the title, * * *." 33 CJS page 500 Sec. 239 (a). 
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The Court in DUNN v. PONCELEK, 178 So. 40, 
235 Ala. 269, held that all a law court out of which the 
execution issued could do was to vacate the sale, it had 
no authority to cancel the sheriff's deed. The remedy 
at law was inadequate and a suit in equity would lie. 
The Court said: 
"Where, therefore, there has been a sale of 
property under judicial process and a deed has 
been issued to the purchaser, and the circum-
stances attending the sale are such as render the 
sale voidable at the election of the execution 
defendant, a Court of equity will entertain a bill 
to vacate the sale and cancel the deed as a cloud 
upon the debtor's title." 
In STKONG v. TEDDEK, 196 S. 829, 143 Fla. 473, 
the Court held that a motion to vacate a sheriff's deed 
cannot be addressed to a common law court from whence 
it issued as the common law court would not have 
authority to cancel the deed, that the remedy at law was 
inadequate and resort must be had in equity. 
In Young v. Schroeder, 10 U. 155, 37 P. 252, 
affirmed 16 S. Ct. 512, 116 U.S. 334, 40 L. Ed. 721, the 
court in an equity action vacated sheriff's deeds and the 
Supreme Court of the United States in discussing equity 
jurisdiction, said : 
"Probably, if a motion had been made in 
the original case to set aside the sale upon the 
ground of mere irregularities, such motion would 
have to be made before the statutory period for 
redemption had passed; but in this class of cases, 
where fraudulent conduct is imputed to the 
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parties conducting the sale, there is a concurrent 
jurisdiction of a court of equity, founded upon 
its general right to relieve from the consequences 
of fraud, accident, or mistake, which may be 
exercised, notwithstanding the statutory period 
for redemption has expired. It is evident that, 
where a sale has culminated in the execution and 
delivery of a deed to the purchaser, which is not 
void upon its face, or a mortgage has been put 
upon the property, as in this case, no remedy is 
complete which does not go to the cancellation of 
such deed, and the complete reinvestment of the 
title in the plaintiff. It also appears from the 
findings that appellant has received rents from 
the property, that various sums had been ex-
pended for taxes and other purposes, that an 
accounting was necessary in adjusting the rights 
of the parties, which could not be effectually 
carried on in a court of law. There can be no 
doubt of the jurisdiction of a court of equity in 
such case notwithstanding the expiration of the 
statutory time of redemption." 
To the same effect see DRAGOON MARBLE AND 
MINING COMPANY v. McNEISH, 235 Pac. 401, 28 
Ariz. 96; JENKINS v. MERRIWEATHER, 109 111. 
647; SCHANTZ v. CLEMMER, et al, 50 A. (2) 289. 
The foregoing decisions not only establish that a 
suit to set aside sheriff's deed in equity is a proper 
remedy but they recognize that such is a direct and not 
a collateral attack. 
In Thomas v. Thomas, 44 Mont. 102, 119 Pac. 283, 
the purchaser after receiving the sheriff's deed peti-
tioned the court by way of a writ of assistance to be put 
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in possession. The appellant resisted on the ground 
that the sale was irregular. He did not seek to vacate 
the deed. The court said : 
"At most, the failure to sell separately is a 
mere irregularity, which may or may not result 
in prejudice to the defendant. / / he deems him-
self aggrieved, he may move to have the sale set 
aside and the property resold, or he may proceed 
by bill in equity. Either method would constitute 
a direct attach upon the sale. But he ought not 
to be permitted to remain silent and inactive 
until demand is made for possession, and then 
resist such demand by collateral attack upon the 
proceedings leading up to the sale." (Itallics 
added) 
See also 33 C.J.S. Sec. 242, p. 507. Home Owners Loan 
Corp. v. Braxton, 44 N.E. (2) 989. 
THE EXECUTION AND DELIVERY BY PEN-
DER TO DOWSE OF THE QUIT CLAIM DEED 
DATED JULY 22, 1949, EFFECTED A SATIS-
FACTION AND DISCHARGE OF THE JUDGMENT 
ENTERED IN CASE No. 86,895 AND THE EXECU-
TION AND SALE WAS ON A SATISFIED JUDG-
MENT. 
The Respondent alleged and the trial court found 
that the execution and sale was made upon a satisfied 
judgment. By Finding of Fact No. 7 (R, 241), the 
Court found: 
"7. That on November 29, 1949, the said 
n Rennold Pender, upon the solicitation and request 
A of S. W. Dowse and in consideration of the pay-
ment by S. W. Dowse to Rennold Pender of 
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$100.00, executed and delivered to the said S. W. 
Dowse a Quit Claim Deed to the property in-
volved in Civil Action No. 86,895. That it was 
agreed between the said S. W. Dowse and Ken-
nold Pender that said transaction was to settle X 
all differences arising in and out of said case, 
Civil No. 86,895, and to terminate the said 
Kennold Pender's right of appeal from the judg-
ment entered therein." 
and the Court's Conclusion of Law said: 
"1 . That the execution and delivery of the 
quit claim deed by Eennold Pender, plaintiff, to 
defendant S. W. Dowse, affecting property, the 
subject of action, Civil No. 86,895, constituted a 
full and complete settlement of said case for all 
intents and purposes, and a satisfaction of the 
judgment in said action and plaintiff was entitled 
to have the judgment out of which execution and 
levy and sale of the property herein affected 
satisfied. That defendant S. W. Dowse is 
estopped from denying otherwise." 
The evidence supports the finding. The Court was 
entitled to draw all reasonable inferences from the 
evidence and we believe in light of the evidence that the 
finding is clearly supported. 
It is undisputed that after the entry of the judg-
ment upon which the execution issued and the sale was 
made Mr. Duncan attorney for Dowse approached Mr. 
Backman, attorney for Pender, for the purpose of 
negotiating an arrangement by which Kespondent's 
appeal time in Civil Case No. 86,895 could be terminated. 
An arrangement was worked out and Mr. Dowse paid 
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Mr. Pender the sum of $100.00 to terminate Pender's 
right of appeal and Pender executed and delivered a 
quit claim deed. The dispute here is whether the 
delivery of the deed by Respondent was intended as a 
settlement of the differences of the parties and a satis-
faction of the judgment entered. Although no mention 
was made of the cost judgment during negotiations the 
arrangements arrived at were all had after the entry of 
the cost judgment and Respondent's right of appeal 
lay from both the judgment quieting title and the cost 
judgment. His right of appeal was from the judgment 
quieting title, which included costs. When respondent 
ana Dowse, through their counsel, reached an agree-
ment terminating respondent's right of appeal it ef-
*y fected a settlement of all of the phases of the action and 
resulted in a settlement of the differences of the parties 
and a satisfaction of the judgment. This intent is further 
borne out by the fact that Mr. Duncan did not nor did he 
claim the right to deduct $22.80 from the $100.00 in satis-
faction of the costs. Certainly no other finding could 
A have been reached from the evidence. 
It is most difficult to follow appellant's argument 
that a deed given to cut off an appeal period as is con-
ceded by appellant is not a settlement of the case as to 
that part of the judgment assessing costs. Appellant 
says: "The quit claim deed mentioned in said finding 
was to terminate Pender's right of appeal from the judg-
ment against him in said case and not satisfy the judg-
ment for costs against him," we are unable to conceive 
of one part of a judgment being satisfied without the 
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other. How can it be said that only the judgment quiet-
ing title was satisfied, inasmuch as respondent's right of 
appeal was from the judgment quieting title which in-
cluded the cost judgment, it is one judgment. 
There is an abundance of evidence supporting the 
court's finding on this point. However, even if there was 
no evidence the court would not be in error in finding 
as it did, this being an equity case the court had a right 
to invoke the maxim equity regards as done what ought 
to be done. 
As to the date of the deed delivered by respondent 
to appellant that is of no consequence, Backman 
explained that the deed had been made out previous to 
the time of delivery to be used in a deal with a Mr. ^ 
Steiner which deal was never consumated. (R 92). 
Appellant accepted the benefits of the act and has 
made no offer to place the parties in status quo. 
(1 Am. Jur. 220) 
Assuming for the purpose of argument that the cost 
judgment was not satisfied, had appellant intended to 
press payment on his cost judgment it was his duty to do 
so at the time he was paying over monies to respondent 
against whom he held the judgment, then appellant had 
monies under his control, belonging to respondent out of 
which the judgment could have been satisfied, it is clearly 
evident that appellant was not desirous of effecting satis-
faction of the judgment, but appellant saw an opportunity 
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to grab thousands of dollars worth of property for little 
or nothing. 
Appellant treated the judgment as wholly satisfied in 
passing title to the property described in the deed to a 
third party, otherwise that property which appellant 
conveyed to his grantee would have been clouded with 
the lien of the cost judgment. 
We agree with the statement of appellant that it 
is from the evidence that the intent of the parties must 
be determined and the court found on such evidence. 
^ Nothing could be so far from the truth that it was not 
the intention of the parties to make a complete and full 
settlement of the case in which the cost judgment was 
entered. Even if this were not the fact appellant Dowse 
is estopped to deny otherwise. 
AN EXECUTION SALE AND SHERIFF'S 
DEED WILL BE SET ASIDE FOR GROSS INADE-
QUACY OF PRICE I F SO GREAT AS TO SHOCK 
THE UNDERSTANDING OR THE CONSCIENCE 
OR AS TO AMOUNT TO FRAUD, UNFAIRNESS 
OR OPPRESSION. 
We believe that the sale was on a satisfied judgment 
and of necessity void. However, we now pass to a con-
sideration of the effect of the sheriff's sale. 
As it is questionable whether the Court in National 
Realty Sales Company v. Ewing, 55 U. 438, 186 P. 1103, 
intended to lay down the rule that gross inadequacy of 
consideration was not sufficient grounds to set aside a 
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sheriff's sale or deed, we present this question to the 
Court for its consideration, particularly in view of 
Young vs. Schroeder, supra. 
The property, the subject of this action, consisted of 
four noncontiguous tracts of land situated in the North 
Columbia Subdivision, Salt Lake County, Utah. It is 
undisputed that at the date of sale they had a fair 
market value, at execution sale, of approximately $8000.-
00. 
The values of the property were fixed as to their 
fair market value at a forced or execution sale at the 
date of sale. The following similar questions and 
answers were given as to all of the tracts: 
"Q. Mr. LeCheminant, do you have an 
opinion as to what the fair market value 
of Lots 2, 3 and 4, Block 8, of the North 
Columbia Sub-division at execution sale 
was the 14th day of March, 1950? 
A. Yes, I do. 
Q. Will you state? 
A. My opinion of the value is $6,000.00 for 
those three lots. 
Q. In establishing that value, did you take 
into consideration there was a judgment 
against this property in the sum of 
$13.20? 
A. In establishing value I assumed the title 
is marketable. 
Q. Then this value you placed on this 
property would be $13.20 less? 
A. If there were any judgments against it, 
it would be less the judgments. 
Q. Less the amount of the judgment? 
A. Yes. (R. 78-79). 
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The appellants did not dispute the values placed on 
the properties by the respondent's witness and this is 
so notwithstanding the appellant Dowse was a real 
estate broker. 
As heretofore stated the properties were purchased 
by appellant Dowse at execution sale for $46.47. 
The general rule is that a Court in equity will not 
set aside a sheriff's sale or deed for inadequacy of con-
sideration unless accompanied by irregularities, unfair-
ness, oppression or fraud. However, there is a well 
recognized exception and that is where the consideration 
is so grossly inadequate as to shock the conscience of 
the Court, one which no honest man would take advan-
tage of there arises a conclusive presumption of fraud, 
unfairness or oppression. In YOUNG v. SCHKOEDEK, 
10 U. 155, 37 P. 252, affirmed 16 Sup. Ct. 512, 161, U.S. 
334, 40 L. Ed. 721, supra, the Court said at page 166 : 
"It is insisted by appellants that mere 
inadequacy of price, however gross, will not 
authorize the courts to set aside a judicial sale. 
The general rule undoubtedly is that mere inade-
quacy of price, alone, does not authorize the 
disturbance of such a sale; but we are not pre-
pared to sanction the unqualified statement of 
• the rule as put by appellants' counsel. If the 
inadequacy is so gross as at once to shock the 
conscience of all fair and impartial minds, if the 
sacrifice is such that every honest man would 
hestitate to take advantage of it, it may well be 
doubted whether every such case would be beyond 
the power of a court of equity to relieve against." 
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In BEATTON v. GKAHAM, 111 So. 353, 146 Miss. 
246, the Court held that a sale was void where property 
valued between $12,000 to $25,000 sold at execution sale 
for $600.00 and the sheriff's deed was set aside. The 
Court said: 
"With reference to the judgment obtained 
by James Stone and Sons, attorneys, and the 
sale under execution, this sale was void because 
of gross inadequacy received for the land * * *." 
(Italics added) 
In DUNN v. PONCELEB, 178 So. 40, 235 Ala. 269, 
supra, the Court set aside a sheriff's deed for gross 
inadequacy of consideration. On June 20, 1932, the 
judgment creditor purchased at execution sale a tract 
of land worth $6,000.00 for $100.00, another $1500.00 
for $10.00. The sheriff's deed issued on the same day. 
Subsequently, under an alias writ of execution he 
purchased a tract of land worth $2,770.00 for $75.00, 
another worth $500.00 for $25.00 and a third worth 
$200.00 for $25.00. Sheriff's deed issued August 1, 1932. 
The purchaser took possession and held for four years 
before suit was brought. The sole ground for setting 
aside the deeds was gross inadequacy of price. The 
Court said: 
"The rule obtaining in this jurisdiction, and 
which has been recognized and followed by this 
Court for more than 100 years, is that mere 
inadequacy of price not sufficient to create the 
presumption of fraud will not violate a judicial 
decision, but where the inadequacy is so glaring 
and gross as to at once shock the understanding 
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and conscience of an honest and just man it will, 
of itself, authorize the Court to set aside the 
sale." 
In ELLIS v. POWELL, 117 S. W. (2) 225, the 
Supreme Court of Missouri set aside a sheriff's deed 
for gross inadequacy of consideration and said: 
"It is the general rule that a sheriff's sale 
of real property under execution will not be set 
aside on mere inadequacy of consideration. How-
ever, an exception to this rule is stated by a 
standard text as follows: 'Inadequacy of con-
sideration, if it be so gross a nature as to amount 
in itself to conclusive and decisive evidence of 
fraud, is a ground for cancelling the transaction. 
In such cases the relief is granted, not on the 
ground of inadequacy of consideration, but on the 
ground of fraud as evidenced thereby.' Kerr on 
Fraud and Mistake, 161, citing many authorities." 
In VAN SENDEN v. O'BRIEN, 58 Fed. (2), 689, 
(C.C.D.C.) the Court set aside Marshall's Deed rdne 
years after the deeds had issued. Judgment was obtained 
in 1916 for $250.00 against Irving E. Jones. In 1918 
his property was sold at Marshall's sale. One tract of 
land valued at $4,000 was purchased for $200.00, another 
worth $1300.00 for $25.00 and a third tract worth $700.00 
for $10.00. Jones died in 1923, and in 1917 Mrs. Jones 
conveyed her dower interest in the property to the 
purchaser. In 1927 Jones' children filed an action to 
set aside the deeds, the Court at that late date ordered 
them vacated. The Court said, at page 691: 
"While it is true the lower court found that 
there was no active fraud on Van Senden's part, 
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which we understand to mean that the sale was 
had in the ordinary way and after proper adver-
tisement, it nevertheless found, and we think 
correctly, that the inadequacy of the sale price 
was so gross as to shock the conscience. Where 
this is the case, the invariable practice has been, 
on proper showing, to set the sale aside. The 
difficulty in the present case grows out of the 
delay in the application." 
and again the Court said at page 692: 
"The court below saw and heard the witness, 
and reached the conclusion that the transaction 
out of which this property was acquired for this 
grossly inadequate sum could not be approved, 
and we see no good reason to reverse its con-
clusion. As was said by Chancellor Desaussure 
in Butler v. Haskell, 4 Desaus. (S.C.) 651,697: 
'Wherever the court perceives that a sale of 
property has been made at a grossly inadequate 
price, such as would shock a correct mind, this 
inadequacy furnishes a strong, and in general 
a conclusive presumption, though there be no 
direct proof of fraud, that an undue advantage 
has been taken of the ignorance, the weakness, 
or the distress and necessity of the vendor.' In 
Massachusetts the statute provides that property 
sold at judicial sale may be redeemed within a 
year and not after, but the Supreme Court, in 
Graffam v. Burgess, 117 U.S. 180, 6 S.Ct. 686, 
29 L. Ed. 839, relieved against this statutory 
provision and permitted a later redemption in 
a case in many respects similar to this." 
In the case of McLellan v. Penick, 289 Fed. 366 
(CC 5th), the Court in equity declared a sale void after 
the purchaser went into possession where the price paid 
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for property worth $75,000.00 was $27,500.00. The Court 
said: 
"The plantation was unincumbered, and was 
easily divisible. It was unnecessary to sell the 
whole of it. Under these circumstances, which 
surrounded the attachment suits and the sheriff's 
sale, and considering the small aggregate amount 
of the judgments as compared to the value of the 
property, we are of opinion that the levy was 
so excessive as to make it the duty of a court of 
equity to declare void the sheriff's sale and deed 
to the appellant. 17 R.C.L. 206; Fortin v. 
Segwick, 133 Iowa, 233, 110 N.W. 460, 12 Ann. 
Cas. 337; Williamson v. White, 101 Ga. 276, 28 
S. E. 846, 65 Am. St. Rep. 302; Forbes v. Hall, 
102 Ga. 47, 28 S.E. 915, 66 Am. St. Rep. 152." 
To the same effect Hart v. Parrish, 244 S.W. (2) 
105; Butler v. Slattery, 237 N. W. 232, 212 Iowa 277; 
Haish v. Hall, 265 P. 1030, 90 Cal. App. 547; 33 C.J.S. 
p. 494, Sec. 234. 
AN EXECUTION SALE AND SHERIFF'S DEED 
ISSUED AFTER THE PERIOD OF REDEMPTION 
HAS EXPIRED WILL BE VACATED WHERE THE 
PRICE IS INADEQUATE AND THE SALE IS 
ATTENDED WITH IRREGULARITIES, A CON-
SPIRACY, FRAUD OR UNFAIRNESS. 
This is not a case where Respondent must rely on 
gross inadequacy of price for there was gross inadequacy 
of price coupled with fraud, a conspiracy, unfairness 
and irregularities. 
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The real purpose of the sale was not to satisfy a 
judgment of $22.80 but was a result of a design to gain 
all of Pender's real estate worth several thousand dollars 
for a few dollars. Dowse and others conspired to 
this end. 
If, as Dowse argues, there was no intent to satisfy 
the cost judgment by the delivery of the deed, he had 
already set in motion his scheme. No demand during 
negotiations being made for its payment nor was there 
an attempt to withhold the $22.80, the amount of the 
judgment, out of the $100.00 paid by Dowse for the quit 
claim deed. We believe, however, it was the intent that 
the judgment was to have been satisfied and that the 
scheme developed later because of the silence on the part 
of Mr. Backman regarding the cost judgment, no demand 
being made for its release, which it was Dowse's duty to 
satisfy regardless. 
The record clearly supports the Court's findings of 
fraud and of conspiracy. After the entry of the cost 
judgment no demand was made for its payment either 
by Dowse or Duncan nor did they advise Respondent or 
Mr. Backman, his attorney, that execution had issued; 
that they had levied on his real estate or that a sale 
had taken place. They stood by silent until after the 
period of redemption had expired. There was ample 
opportunity to advise them as Dowse, Duncan, Pender 
and Backman are all residents of Salt Lake City; Dowse 
and Pender were in conferences about other matters 
and Duncan and Backman not only negotiated the deed 
transaction but they saw each other on the street several 
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times. The telephone was always available. Why this 
silence if a conspiracy was not in progress f 
The evidence further established the fact and the 
trial court found that on the date of the execution and 
sale, appellant Dowse had in his possession personal 
' property belonging to respondent worth several times 
the amount of the judgment; that respondent owned an 
automobile; that he had bank accounts in three Salt Lake 
City banks, and upon the property levied upon and sold 
stood personal property worth in excess of $1000.00 out 
of which the judgment could have been satisfied. All of 
which was known to appellant Dowse and to his attor-
ney. 
If this was no design on the part of Dowse to deprive 
respondent of realty worth many thousands of dollars 
under color of attempting to satisfy a judgment of 
$22.80, why did appellant Dowse direct the sheriff to 
levy on respondent's realty in violation of law which 
directs that before sale of real estate a judgment must be 
satisfied from the un-exempt personal property of the 
debtor? And further, why no attempt to collect the judg-
ment toy garnishment proceedings ? 
Appellant Dowse knew if he had a valid judgment, 
respondent would have paid the same had request for 
payment been made, or that by a simple, inexpensive 
method, the judgment could have been collected. Appel-
lant Dowse had ample opportunity to enlighten respond-
ent. This he never did but on the contrary he continued 
*\ ^ to deal with respondent in all respects as theretofore, 
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being most careful to not disclose the fact that the judg-
ment had been entered and remained unsatisfied, and 
that execution and sale had been instituted thereon. I t 
was a wary and crafty silence on the part of appellant 
Dowse calculated to and actually succeeded in lulling re-
spondent into a sense of security until the redemption 
period had passed. The judgment, if not satisfied, could 
have been satisfied at the time the $100 was paid to re-
spondent by appellant Dowse when the quit claim deed 
was obtained by Dowse to cut off respondent's appeal 
period in the action in which the judgment was entered. 
The evidence is undisputed that the property levied 
on consisted of four non-contiguous tracts of land and 
that either of them was worth more than enough to 
satisfy the judgment, one tract being worth approxi-
mately, $5,814.96, a second tract $1,066.80, a third 
$606.65, and the fourth tract approximately $500.00. 
This was known to Dowse for he was a real estate 
broker of many years' experience and he did not deny 
the values placed thereon by Eespondent's witness and, 
notwithstanding, instead of merely directing the sheriff 
to levy on one tract, which was more than sufficient to 
satisfy the judgment, he caused the sheriff to levy on 
all of them—an excessive levy. 
In addition, Dowse directed the Sheriff to levy on 
the property in such a manner as would discourage 
bidders and to diminish the value of the property being 
sold. They joined commercial and residential property 
and this, in itself, would discourage bidding as usually 
a person interested in commercial property would not 
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be interested in residential property and vise versa. 
These conditions could only be calculated to discourage 
bidders and the prices bid. That there was a conspiracy 
is further borne out by the conduct of Dowse after he 
had contracted to convey two of the lots to Treadway 
for $1000.00, by general warranty deed, he conveyed the 
property by a special warranty deed after Mr. Bird, 
Treadway's attorney, Had questioned Mr. Duncan re-
garding the sheriff's sale. 
In addition to the irregularities noted, that is the 
levying on and selling the real estate before attempting 
to satisfy the judgment out of non-exempt personalty, 
the excessive levy, the court found that the four non-
contiguous tracts were offered en masse and never 
offered separately. Furthermore, Dowse stood by and 
permitted Eespondent to pay the $3,086.44 to Morandi, 
clearing the title to part of the lots in question, knowing 
that Eespondent would probably do so if he remained 
(
 silent. 
Certainly, in view of the foregoing the trial Court's 
findings of fraud, conspiracy and unfairness should be 
upheld. 
Eule 69 Utah Eules Civil Procedure, directs the 
manner in which property will be sold to satisfy a 
judgment. Sub-section (b) provides that the execution 
shall direct the officer to satisfy the judgment out of 
the personal property of the debtor before levying on 
his real property. Sub-section (d) provides that the 
levy shall not be excessive. Sub-section (e) (3) provides 
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that where property is situated in separate parcels they 
will be offered separately before it is offered en masse. 
We have not set forth the rule verbatum as Appellant 
Dowse set it forth at page 12 of his brief. 
As to excessive levy the editors of C.J.S. in vol. 33, 
page 591 said: 
"Excessive levy. It has been held that a levy 
which is excessive, see supra paragraph 107, will 
not invalidate a sale thereunder; but according 
to some authorities if the levy is entirely out of 
proportion to the debt the purchaser acquires no 
title, although this is so only in extreme cases." 
A judgment debtor has a right to have his personal 
goods exhausted before any of his real estate can be 
levied on. 
33 C.J.S. page 251, Sec, 100; 
Haws v. Fracarol, 27 F. (2) 74; 
Blasingame v. Wallan, 261 P. 42, 32 Ariz. 580; 
Stone v. Ordian-Wells Co. 20 P. (2) 639, 94 
Mont. 20; 
Barry v. Horton, 238 N. W. 763, 122 Neb. 20; 
Alt v. Kwiatek, 17 A (2) 161, 128 N. J. Eq. 469. 
A sale en masse where property is in separate 
parcels is prejudicial and void where substantial injury 
is shown and in any event voidable. 
33 C.J.S. page 491, sec. 232; 
National Eealty Sales Co. v. Ewing, 55 U. 438, 
186 Pac. 1103; 
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Adams v. Pratt, District Judge, et al, 87 U. 80, 
48 P. (2d) 444. 
In Young v. Schroeder, 10 Ut. 155, 37 Pac. 252, 
supra, the Court vacated three marshall's deeds where 
property worth $26,000.00 sold for $1927.06. Before 
levying on the real property the marshall attempted to 
satisfy the judgment out of unexempt property of 
judgment debtor. There were three levies all directed 
by the judgment creditor's attorney. The first levy 
severed a portion out of a larger tract to which there 
was no ingress or egress. All of the realty levied upon 
was held in common by the judgment debtor with his 
sister. The Court said: 
"It further appears from the record that it 
was the design and purpose of Stephens & 
Schroeder at the outset to exhaust, if possible, 
. all the property of plaintiff, of whatever nature 
or description, regardless of its value, under 
said several executions, and that they in fact 
accomplished that purpose." 
Again the court said: 
"This is not a case which rests on mere 
inadequacy of price alone, but oner where the 
sales complained of were attented by such sub-
stantial irregularities as must have prevented a 
sale at a fair sum. For instance, one of the par-
cels of said lot 2, levied upon and sold under the 
first execution, is described as beginning 101 
feet north and 39y2 feet east of the southwest 
corner of said lot 2, thence east 15y2 feet, north 
28 feet, west 15y2 feet, and south 28 feet to the 
beginning. Eeference to the plat in evidence 
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shows that the property thus described is a por-
tion of that part of lot 2 to which plaintiff and 
his sister derived title through the will of their 
deceased father, as before stated, and is included 
within the exterior boundaries of that portion 
thereof shown by the record to have been at that 
time leased to one Gebhardt, The purchaser of 
the part thus levied on and sold by the marshall 
acquired a piece of land having no means of 
access to it. It is needless to say that such a 
transaction must necessarily result in a sacrifice 
of the property. Again, in the sales made under 
the several executions of portions of said lot 2 
it appears that in each instance the levy was upon 
and the sale of all the plaintiff's right, title and 
interest in a specific part of the portion of said 
lot 2 so owned by him and his sister, Lydia Y. 
Merrill. This is also an irregularity that renders 
the sale voidable, if not void, the necessary 
tendency of a sale under such a levy being to 
depreciate the value of the property sold." 
And again the court said: 
"It is contended by the appellants that relief 
cannot be granted in this case, because the 
statutory period for redemption had expired 
before this suit was brought. The cases are by 
no means rare where a court of equity has inter-
fered to set aside a sale after the time for 
redemption has expired, such sale having been 
attended by irregularities, and having resulted 
in a gross sacrifice of the judgment debtor's 
property." 
In Magnus v. Tobias 169 N. E. 741, 337 111. 605, the 
Equity Court set aside a sheriff's deed which issued 
after the period of redemption had expired where 
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property valued at $25,000.00 was purchased for $107.73. 
The judgment debtor had no notice of the sale. Demand 
for payment of the judgment was never made upon her. 
The Court said: 
"Appellants also insists that services of the 
execution and demand for property was not 
necessary. Whether section 28 of the Cost Act 
(Smith-Hurd Eev. St. 1929, C. 33) applies or not, 
appellee was not served with the execution, and 
one cannot read this record without being con-
vinced that the actions of appellant and his 
attorney, Webster, in levying the execution, sell-
ing the land at judicial sale, and acquiring a deed 
to it, were conducted in a manner well calculated 
to leave appellee in ignorance that her property 
had been sold. It is very evident from the record 
V that she did not intend to abandon the property, 
for she reduced the principal of the mortgage on 
the property to $10,000 after the sale, also col-
lected rents from the property and paid the taxes 
against it. After appellant had notified the 
tenants on the property to pay him the rent 
appellee became aware of the fact her property 
worth $35,000.00, subject to encumbrances of 
$11,500.00, had been sold to appellant and 
Webster for $107.73 to pay a judgment for $86.45 
rendered against appellee. The price for which 
the property was sold was grossly inadequate, 
in sales under judicial process where there is 
a right of redemption, inadequacy of price and 
accompanied by circumstances of irregularity or 
unfairness will not avoid a sale. I t has been uni-
formity held by this court that where property 
has been sold at judicial sale for a grossly inade-
quate price, even slight circumstances indicating 
unfairness or fraud will furnish sufficient 
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grounds for equitable interference. Wilkinson v. 
Cox, 228 111. 306, 81 N.E. 1020; Davis, Cory & 
Co. v. Chicago Dock Co. 129 111. 180; 21 N.E. 
830; Block v. Cooper, 318 111. 182, 149 N.E. 21. 
It also appears that appellee had ample resources 
both personal and real to pay the judgment for 
costs had she been notified it was demanded by 
appellant." 
The above case is very much like the case at issue. 
In Greenberg v. Kaplan, 268 N. W. 788, 277 Mich. 
1, the Court set aside a deed to property purchased at 
execution sale for $377.40 where the property was worth 
$9,000.00. No demand was made for payment of judg-
ment. Judgment creditor permitted the owner to pay 
the tax. No attempt was made to satisfy the judgment 
by garnishment proceedings although counsel for the 
judgment debtor knew that such a remedy was available. 
The court set aside the deed and held the sale was void. 
The court said: 
"In view of the gross inadequacy of the price, 
coupled with the unmistakable signs of fraud 
and unfairness in the instant case, we hold the 
sale must be set aside. It is quite significant that 
no attempt was made to collect the balance of 
the judgment and that Bartlett, who had an 
interest in the judgment, was not given any share 
of the proceeds. Chaplain, as attorney for 
Schevitz & Bartlett, knew that he had funds 
either in his possession or largely under his con-
trol which by a simple, inexpensive method, 
quickly could have been applied to the judgment. 
Baier's interest in the property of a value of at 
least $9,000 was bid in for $377.40 in Chaplain's 
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presence by his brother-in-law, in the name of 
one who had every appearance of being a dummy. 
Although Chaplain had reasons to believe that 
Baier did not know of the sale because of Baier's 
actions in bringing the injunction suit and paying 
taxes, both after the sale had taken place, and 
although Chaplain had ample opportunity to 
enlighten Baier, he never did this. Although 
"I Chaplain, if he had told his partner, Greenberg, 
; of the opportunity to rid themselves of an obli-
gation of approximately $9,000 for much less, 
might have been able to procure enough cash to 
bid in at the sale, he chose to remain silent and 
f let his brother-in-law buy in under the name of 
a client and friend of Chaplain. In view of the 
surrounding circumstances and the actions of 
the parties despite the carelessness of Mulford 
and the attack on his credibility, we believe that 
an agreement was made between Chaplain and 
Mulford that garnishment would be resorted to 
in collecting the Schevitz judgment against Baier; 
but, in view of Baier's and Mulford's reasonable 
reliance upon this agreement, the execution and 
sale, in contravention of the understanding, were 
fraudulent." 
In Citizens State Bank vs. McBoberts, 239 P. 1028, 
29 Ariz. 173, the court in equity vacated a sheriff's deed 
issued after the period of redemption had expired where 
property worth $17,833.00 sold to satisfy a judgment 
of $705.39. The Court said: 
"Now, it must be admitted that the price 
realized for the property was grossly inadequate 
, —less than 5 per cent, of its average estimated 
value. We know the courts are reluctant to set 
aside deeds of property, sold under legal process, 
merely for inadequacy of price, and justly so. 
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Generally speaking, they will not do so, unless 
the equity of the situation is so appealing as that 
to do otherwise would shock the judgment and 
the conscience. * * * In view of the fact that 
plaintiff had never denied her liability on the 
note but always admitted it, and only neglected to 
take it up because of the assurance of the primary 
debtor that he would endeavor to pay it, and the 
bank's agents having full knowledge that she 
was only an accommodation maker, we think in 
fairness such agents should have seen her per-
sonally and told her, not only of Starr's delin-
quency, but what steps they contemplated taking 
against her property; or, somewhere along the 
line and before the right of redemption expired, 
they should have informed her of the situation. 
In failing to impart such information to plain-
tiff, and in instructing the bank's attorney not 
to do so, they not only took an undue advantage 
of her, but pursued a course well calculated to 
mislead and surprise her. This circumstance, 
in connection with the great disparity of price 
realized to the value of the property, it would 
seem is amply sufficient reason to cancel the 
deed." 
In Lovejoy v. Americus 191 P. 790, 111 Wash. 571, 
the court set aside the sheriff's deed issued after 
the period of redemption had expired where property 
worth in excess of $4000.00 was sold at sheriff's sale for 
$87.29, because of inadequacy of price failure to notify 
the judgment creditor of the sale although the statute did 
not require it, and this notwithstanding that prior to 
the sale the judgment debtor had made repeated 
demands upon the judgment debtor for payment of the 
judgment. The judgment creditor permitted the judg-
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ment debtor to pay taxes and special improvements and 
to improve the property. The Court said : 
"The judgment in the present case is entirely 
justified. The respondents acted promptly upon 
receiving notice that their property had been 
sold. Mr. Lovejoy was a teamster in the town of 
Hillyard, and trusted nearly all his otEer business 
to his wife, who was, much of the time, almost 
an invalid. After the issuance of the execution, 
followed by the sheriff's sale, and while the 
rights of respondents were passing away by the 
lapse of time into the hands of appellant 
Americus, the continuous dunning theretofore 
engaged in was changed into an apparently wary 
and crafty silence, highly calculated to and 
aictually succeeded in lulling the respondents into 
a sense of security until the year for redemption 
passed bv. Graff am v. Burgess, 117 U. S. 180, 
6 Sup. Ct. 686, 29 L. Ed. 839. The judgment, 
with interest and costs, could have been satisfied, 
prior to the execution, by garnishment proceed-
ings against the tenant of respondents for less 
than 5 months' rental, while during the period 
of redemption from the sheriff's sale the amount 
of the judgment, interest, and costs, and increased 
costs, of $87.92, could have been satisfied by less 
than 6 months' rental from the same tenant, to 
which appellants, as purchasers at the sheriff's 
sale, were entitled under the provisions of section 
602, Kern. Code." 
To the same effect see: 
Graffam v. Burgess, 117 U.S. 180, 6 Sup. Ct. 686, 
21 L. Ed. 839; 
VanGraafieland v. Wright, 228 S.W. 465, 268 
Mo. 414; 
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33 CJS, page 494, See. 234; 
Foote v. Kansas City Life Insurance Co. 92 
Fed (2) 744; 
Home Owners Loan Corp. vs. Braxton, 44 
N.E. (2) 989; 
Rogers v. Barton, 53 N.E. (2) 862, 386.111. 244; 
Fox v. Jackson, 64 N.E. (2) 799, 116 Ind. 
App. 390; 
Baar v. Smith, 257 P. 861, 97 Cal. App. 398; 
Hyman v. Stern, 215 P. 911, 61 Cal. App. 566; 
Darden v. Reese, 200 P. (2) 81, 88 Cal. App. 904; 
Boiani v. Wilson, 132 Atl. 881, 41 R. I. 317; 
Neussler v. Bergman, 251 P. 578,141 Wash. 297. 
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE COURT'S 
FINDING OF SLANDER OF TITLE, ITS AWARD OF 
EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY'S FEES. 
Appellant Dowse asks this court to reverse its deci-
sion in the case of Dowse v. Doris Trust Co., (Utah), 
208 P2d 956. 
In the instant case we have a real estate broker of 
long years' experience who knew the effect his acts would 
have on the title to respondent's property. Appellant 
by his wrongful acts wholly deprived respondent of the 
use and enjoyment of his property and deprived respon-
dent of the rentals received therefrom by respondent 
prior to the sheriff's sale. 
Appellant challenges the court's finding of slander 
of title and contends that a cause of action for slander 
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or disparagement of property or of the title thereto 
was neither alleged or proved. 
Kespondent alleged in paragraphs 13 and 14 of his 
complaint that appellant in all of the acts theretofore 
specifically set forth acted maliciously and in order to 
vex and harass respondent and that appellant knew the 
filing of the judgment and the sale of the property would 
cast a cloud upon and slander upon respondent's title 
and that the same decreased the value of respondent's 
real estate and made it unmarketable. 
That by paragraph 17 of respondent's complaint 
respondent alleges that appellant acted maliciously and 
that appellant was guilty of oppression and malice. That 
the case is one in which punitive and exemplary damages 
is proper and that $20,000 is a proper amount of exem-
plary and punitive damages. 
The evidence not only showed that the appellant 
failed to satisfy the judgment which cast a cloud upon 
all of the property of respondent after having accepted 
the benefits of the deed given by respondent to cut off 
his appeal period and settle the differences between 
appellant and respondent which the trial court found 
satisfied the judgment but in addition appellant pro-
cured title to all of the property levied upon and sold 
at sheriff's sale, thus depriving respondent of his title 
to his property. 
The decision in Burkett v. Griffiths cited by appel-
lant was decided in 1891. That decision has been 
broadened as is pointed out by appellant. 
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The Gudger v. Manton case, 21 Cal. 2d, 537, 134 
P2d 217 relied upon by appellant appears to be more 
favorable to respondent than to appellant. In that case 
the plaintiff was awarded compensatory damages in the 
sum of $16,000 in an action for slander of title. The 
slander consisted of defendant's having caused execu-
tion on a judgment to be made without a privilege to do 
so. The court quoted from Eestatement, Torts, Sec. 624 
saying: 
"At the outset it is helpful to have before 
us an accurate definition of that tort. It may be 
best stated as follows: 'One who, without a privi-
lege to do so, publishes matter which is untrue 
and disparaging to another's property in land 
under such circumstances as would lead a reason-
able man to foresee that the conduct of a third 
person as purchaser or lessee thereof might be 
determined thereby, is liable for pecuniary loss 
resulting to the other from the impairment of 
vendibility thus caused.'" 
The court in applying the rule said: 
"It has been held that the recording of a docu-
ment making a false claim to real property may 
constitute the publication of the disparaging 
matter in the tort in question." 
Appellant cites the Wyoming case of Barquin v. 
Hall Oil Co., 28 Wyo. 164, 201 Pac. 352, 202 Pac. 1107, 
and argues that the facts showing the special damages 
claimed must be stated, that an intending purchaser of 
the property was prevented from making a contract to 
buy or from buying the land or that a third party 
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purchaser was induced to breach his contract. This same 
argument was used by the defendant Doris Trust Com-
pany in the case of Dowse vs. Doris Trust Company, 
supra, in which the court speaking through Mr. Justice 
Wade said: 
"Defendants president is a real estate broker 
with more than 40 years of experience in the 
real estate business. At the time he filed the 
instrument he knew that he had no rights or 
interest in the property, and did so either to 
force plaintiff to sell to him or make it difficult 
to sell to anyone else, under such a state of facts 
his filing was malicious. See Kelly v. First State 
Bank, 145 Minn. 331, 177 N.W. 347, 9 ALE 929 
and annotation on page 931. In the Kelly case 
the court held that the malicious filing for record 
of an instrument known to be inoperative is 
regarded as slander of title, but if the person 
records an instrument he has a right to record, 
it is, of course, not slander of title. Under the 
pleading and the facts proved, defendant did 
not have a privilege to record the instrument and 
his doing so was malicious." 
The court further said: 
"It is defendant's contention that plaintiff having 
failed to allege and prove a particular sale or 
sales which had been lost because of its action 
that plaintiff had failed to present for the con-
sideration of the court, an essential element of 
the action for slander of title, i.e., a pecuniary 
loss. It is defendant's contention that attorneys 
fees are not recoverable as special damages and 
that such damages can only be proven by the loss 
of a particular sale which must be alleged as 
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well as proved. It cites as authority for this 
contention the cases of McGuiness v. Hargiss, 
56 Wash. 162, 105 P.233, 21 Ann. Cas. 220, 
Hubbard v. Scott, 85 Or. 1, 166 P. 33, and City 
of Shreveport v. Kahn, 194 La. 55, 193 So. 461. 
All of the above cases held that attorneys' fees 
are not recoverable in an action for slander of title. 
However, we are not impressed with the reason-
ing of those cases and others to the same effect. 
The action of slander of title is based on a wrong-
ful act but for which the plaintiff would not have 
had to incur any expense, either for costs or for 
attorney's fees. The reasoning in Chesbro v. 
Powers, 78 Mich. 472, 44 N.W. 290, is more in 
harmony with justice." (Itallics added) 
Mr. Justice Wade then goes on and quotes extensively 
from the Chesebro case. 
Appellant contends that there is no evidence to 
support the court's finding 9 and charges the trial court 
with an illegal, capricious and wholly arbitrary finding 
and says the court was confused in awarding punitive 
and exemplary damages, claiming that the only damages 
allowable for slander of title are special damages. Such 
is not the case. This court said in the Dowse v. Doris 
Trust Company case supra: 
"That punitive damages may be awarded in an 
action for slander of title see Hopkins v. Drowne, 
21 K.I. 20, 41 A. 567." 
From a reading of the Hopkins case cited by the 
Utah court in the Doris Trust case we find the following 
statement by the court: 
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"In addition to the actual damages sustained by 
the plaintiff, it was discretionary with the jury 
to also award punitive or exemplary damages. 
(Kenyon v. Cameron, 17 E.I. 122, 20 Atl. 233; 
Vogel v. McAuliffe, 18 E.I. 791, 31 Atl. 1.)" 
The trial court having properly found that the acts 
of appellant were malicious, respondent is entitled to 
an award as pecuniary and exemplary damages of con-
siderably more than the $500.00 granted by the trial 
court. 
In answer to subdivision V of appellant's brief, 
Whether Attorney's fees in an action for slander of 
title are allowable, appellant again asks this court to re-
verse the Dowse v. Doris Trust Company case supra 
from which case we have quoted under Respondent's 
answer to subdivision IV of appellant's brief and 
in which case this court quoted from Restatement of 
the Law of Torts, Sec. 633, pages 347-8, wherein it 
is stated: 
"The pecuniary loss for which a publisher of 
disparaging matter is liable under the rules 
stated in Sees. 624 and 626-627 is restricted to 
'(a) that pecuniary loss which directly and 
immediately results from the impairment of the 
vendibility of the thing in question caused by 
publication of the disparaging matter, and 
(b) the expense of litigation reasonably 
necessary to remove the doubt cast by the dis-
paragement upon the other's property in the 
thing or upon the quality thereof.'" 
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Following which Mr. Justice Wade said: 
"Attorney's fees are certainly a reasonable 
expense of litigation." 
To the same effect do we answer subdivision VI 
on the question of punitive damages. | 
I t has been said that to support a judgment for 
pecuniary damages malice must be expressed. I t is also 
said that malice need not be expressly shown but it may 
be implied. 
See Gudger v. Manton, (Cal.) 134 P2d 217 in which 
the court said: 
"True, it has been said or intimated that 
malice is an essential element in slander of title. 
(Citing cases) That malice may, however, be 
express or implied. Feron v. Fodera, 169 Cal. 
370, 148 P. 200; Kendis v. Cohn, 90 Cal. App. 41, 
265 P. 844; see cases collected 129 A.L.R. 179. 
And if there is an absence of privilege or justi-
fication, and the other elements necessary are 
present, an implication of malice in Jaw is proper, 
if that term is used, or actual malicd may in some 
cases show lack of privilege." 
The Gudger v. Manton case supra, involved the levy 
and recording of a writ of execution upon real property 
regarding which the ruling of the court is Applicable and 
which is in part as follows: f 
"Such instruments on record had all the appear-
ance of an assertion by defendants of a claim to 
an interest in the property, and as a matter of 
common knowledge would have an effect upon 
a prospective purchaser of the property and the 
merchantability of the title. He would naturally 
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assume that plaintiff's title was not merchantible, 
as it was encumbered by a lien to an indefinite 
extent. Defendants as reasonable persons should 
have reasonably foreseen that such would be the 
effect of their action. Bestatement, Torts, Sec. 
629. As we have seen, the reasonable imputation 
of the recording was a claim of an interest 
adverse to plaintiff's title. Whether a cloud on 
the title in the technical sense existed wras 
immaterial." 
It is not necessary, however, to rely on implied 
malice inasmuch as there is an abundance of evidence 
to show malice in fact. It is clearly evident that appel-
lant wras disgruntled at respondent's asking for and 
collecting $100 for a quit claim deed given to cut off 
respondent's appeal period. The act thereafter on the 
part of appellant was a design to get even with respon-
dent, not to collect the mere pitance of $22.80 but to 
incurr the greatest amount of expense possible upon 
respondent and to take from respondent all property 
possible. This malice is further borne out by the evi-
dence of appellant's having sold the washing machine 
for $10.00 which respondent entrusted to appellant when 
it had a value of $175.00, which was more than enough 
to satisfy the judgment had it been a valid one. 
Under subdivision V appellant cites general 
principles of law which do not apply to recorded instru-
ments affecting title to real property, nor does appellant 
distinguish those cases involving instruments recorded 
and affecting title to real property and those cases not 
involving these facts. There is a clear distinction. 
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I t has been held that where one places of record 
an instrument which compels the owner to come to terms 
with him is liable in a suit for slander of title. See 
Collins v. Whitehead, (CC) 34 F 121, cited in 150 ALR 
721 in which the court in sustaining a suit in the nature 
of an action for slander of title to recover damages for 
the recording by the defendant of a proposed contract 
of sale after he had failed to comply therewith within 
the required time, said that one who wantonly puts on 
record such a paper, apparently with the intent to com-
pel the owner of the property to come to terms with 
him, ought not to have refuge in the technicalities or 
the weakness of the law; that the injury to the plaintiff 
was real, as he was compelled to bring suit to remove 
the cloud from his title, and, for the time, his property 
was useless to him; and that it would be a reproach to 
the law to give only nominal damages in such a case, 
and a verdict for substantial damages was upheld. 
On appeal, all conflicts in evidence must be resolved 
in favor of respondent, and all legitimate and reasonable 
inferences must be indulged in to uphold the verdict, 
if possible. 
ANALYSIS OF AUTHORITIES CITED 
BY APPELLANT DOWSE 
Appellant Dowse cites four Utah decisions in 
support of his claim that the sale could not be attacked 
in equity, none of which are in point. 
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In Dickert v. Weise, 2 Ut. 350, 40 Pac. St. Eeports, 
350, there was no inadequacy of price, irregularities, 
fraud, unfairness or conspiracy. The sale was fair and 
regular. 
In National Realty Sales Co. v. Ewing, 55 U. 438, 
186 Pac. 1103, the debtor had knowledge of the sale 
and stood silent. The court said there was nothing in 
the record "to suggest fraud and concealment." 
In Chausse v. Bank of Garland, 71 U. 586, 268 Pac. 
781, inadequacy of price, not gross inadequacy of price 
was the sole ground. 
In Adams v. Pratt, District Judge, 87 Utah, 89, 48 
Pac. (2) 444, the only ground for vacating the sale was 
failure to offer separately non-contiguous tracts before 
selling enmass. 
All of the foregoing cases were foreclosure proceed-
ings and the judgment debtor had been notified of the 
sale. In none of the cases cited was there a multiple of 
causes, viz: gross inadequacy of price, irregularities, con-
cealment, fraud, unfairness and conspiracy. It should 
be noted that from this list of cases the only Utah case 
in point Young v. Schroeder, 10 Ut. 155, 37 Pac. 252, 161 
U.S. 334, 40 Law Ed. 721,.16 Sup. Ct. 512 was omitted. 
The appellant Dowse also cites seven California 
cases in support of his position, none of which 
are in point. Some of the cases relied on support 
respondent. In Smith v. Randall, 6 Cal. 47, 2 Pac. St. 
Rep. 47, the judgment debtor was present at the sale 
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and directed the sheriff to sell realty rather than his 
personality. The debtor claimed that he could not waive 
this right. There was no fraud, concealment, unfairness 
or conspiracy. In Bechtel v. Weir, 152 Cal. 443, 93 Pac. 
75, 15 A.L.R. (N.S.) 549, the only irregularity was in 
offering the property for sale, that is, it was not offered 
separately before being sold enmasse. Batini v. Ivancich, 
105 Cal. App. 391, 287 Pac. 523 the sole ground was the 
mis-statement of the date of the entry of the judgment 
the court said: 
"and further than this the court has always lent a 
willing ear to the debtor who could show fraud 
or unfairness in the sale of his property, and 
where a proper sho^ving has been made full relief 
has followed." 
Mitchell v. Alpha Hardware &Supply Co., 7 Cal. 
App. (2) 52, 45 Pac. (2) 442 the sole grounds was 
failure to offer separately before offering enmasse. 
In Knapp vs. Rose, 32 Cal (2d) 530, 197 P (2d) 7, 
the court supports respondent and recognizes that under 
certain facts a suit in equity to vacate a sale and deed 
is proper. 
Appellant would have this Honorable Court apply 
the rule of law as laid down in Rauer v. Hertweck, 175 
Cal 278; 165 Pac. 946. While it is recognized there is 
no legal duty imposed upon the Sheriff to search for 
the debtor in order that he might be given actual notice 
nor of the creditor to do so, still the courts do not and 
will not we think encourage a judgment creditor to 
refrain from making demand upon the debtor, to trans-
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act business matters with the debtor from time to time 
and to continue to deal with the debtor at all times after 
the judgment has been entered and especially one of 
such a small amount, in the same manner as the creditor 
would have done had the relationship of debtor and 
creditor not existed. Appellant knew respondent could 
pay the judgment at any time demand was made upon 
him, however, the record reflects the fact that the con-
cern of appellant at all times was that respondent might 
learn of the judgment before appellant had accomplished 
his cunning act and thus defeat the purpose of appellant. 
Appellant cites Story's Equity Jurisprudence Sec. 
245 as authority in support of his argument that in-
adequacy of consideration is not of itself sufficient 
grounds for relief in equity. Respondent does not rely 
upon inadequacy of consideration alone, neither did the 
trial court find inadequacy of consideration alone as 
grounds for setting aside the sale, the court found in-
adequacy coupled with irregularities, unfairness, fraud 
and a conspiracy. 
The following cases cited by appellants appear 
to be those on which one element alone is involved, viz: 
either inadequacy of consideration, failure to offer in 
separate parcels, failure to satisfy out of unexempted 
personal property or failure to give personal notice of 
sale to debtor; no case is cited wherein all of the elements 
are present as in the instant case. 
In Thomas v. Thomas, 44 Mont. 102, 119 Pac. 283, 
the deed was collaterally attacked because of failure 
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to sell property separately. The court said that the 
debtor should have either moved to set aside the sale or 
proceeded by a bill in equity. That either was a direct 
attack. 
In Fox v. Curry, 96 Mont. 212, 29 Pac. (2) 663, the 
sole ground was a defective notice, however, the court 
said that it appears the whole transaction was in good 
faith. 
In the Idaho case of Coghlan v. City of Boise, 36 
Ida. 613, 212 Pac. 867, the court merely held that a 
judgment debtor present at a sale cannot complain of a 
sale enmasse when he made no request to sell otherwise. 
In Mt. Vernon National Bank v. Morse, 128 Ore. 
64, 264 Pac. 439, the sole ground was an irregularity in 
the notice of sale. 
In Whitworth v. McKee, 32 Wash. 83; 72 Pac. 1046 
the court held that a collateral attack could not be made 
on a judgment when the sheriff made a return that he 
was unable to find personal property sufficient to satisfy 
a judgment. The court recognizes the necessity of such a 
return. We again direct the court's attention to Love joy v. 
Americus, supra, which set aside a Sheriffs Deed issued 
after the period of redemption had expired because of 
inadequacy of price, failure to give notice and failure to 
collect by garnishment proceedings. 
Oliver v. Dougherty, 8 Ariz. 65, 68 Pac. 553 the sole 
ground was failure to levy onj^ersonality, nothing more. 
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Regarding the Arizona decision cited, the attention 
of the Court is directed again to Citizen's State Bank 
vs. McRoberts, supra, in which the court vacated a deed 
issued after the period of redemption had run where 
inadequacy of price, no demand, or notification of sale 
was given. 
In Bird v. Kitchens, Ark; 221 SW (2d) 795, 
cited by appellant we find a case wherein complain-
ant knew of the sheriff's sale being conducted and while 
he did not attend the sale still he sent his secretary to 
attend with instructions to make notes of that which took 
place, after the deed issued he sought to collaterally 
attack the deeds on alleged irregularities committed by 
the officer conducting the sale. 
And in Gross v. Simsack, 364 Pa. 337; 72 Atl. (2d) 
103, we find where property which had an assessed 
value of $7500.00 brought $9100 at the execution sale 
and the court held that there was no showing of 
inadequacy of consideration. 
Respondent is unable to find the Knox v. Noggle 
case under Appellant's citation. 
In Bonner v. Lockhart, 236 Ala. 171; 181 South. 767, 
the court found that the record did not sustain an aver-
ment that complainant had no knowledge of the execu-
tion sale. Complainant had received and ignored the 
statutory demands for possession of the property levied 
upon. The court further found that the right of re-
demption had been forfeited without any action on the 
part of respondent lulling complainant into delay or 
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non-compliance with the demand for possession. It 
appears complainant persistently ignored and dis-
regarded all rights of respondent. 
The Horken v. Eason, 10 Ga. App. 236; 73 S.E. 
352 case cited is one which was decided on an agreed 
statement of facts which does not appear in the record 
of the case. 
In Dixon v. Peacock, 30 Okla. 87; 141 Pac. 429 it 
was agreed between the plaintiff and defendant that 
the proceeding was a collateral attach on the judgment, 
the property sought to be recovered was sold at sheriff's 
sale and the sale was confirmed by the court, the court 
having found the proceedings of the sheriff regular. 
The Sheehan v. All Person, etc. 80 Cal. App. 393; 
252 Pac. 337 case does not appear to be in point, there 
the complaint sought to collaterally attach the judgment 
on which execution issued. 
And in Sellers v. Johnson, 207 Ga. 644; 63 S.E. (2d) 
904 the fraud relied upon was breach of an alleged 
agreement between counsel for the litigants under which 
it was agreed they would notify each other before any 
hearing or issuance of execution or levys or sale of 
property. Respondent failed to give actual notice of 
sale. There was nothing in the record to show that the 
sale was not properly conducted. 
In White v. Adams, 52 Cal. 435; 1 Pac, States Rep. 
435 the court said: 
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"It is to be observed there is nothing in the 
record showing any fraud or bad faith upon the 
part of White, who was the plaintiff in the pro-
ceedings to foreclose the mortgage." 
The Hamilton v. Waters, case 93 Cal. App. 866; 
210 Pac. (2d) 67 is one in which action was brought to 
recover damages against the purchasers at sheriff's 
sale and the marshall by reason of the eviction of com-
plainant from property purchased at sale. In sustaining 
demurrers to the complaint the court said: 
"Her only relief, if her allegation is true, is by 
an action in equity to set aside the judgment. The 
instant cause is a collateral attack on a valid, 
final judgment." 
In H.O.L.C. v. Edwards, 329 Pa. 529; 198 Atl. 123, 
124 the question was on constitutionality of a Mortgage 
Deficiency Act enacted under the laws of the state of 
Penn. This act was held unconstitutional. This case is 
not in point. True the question of inadequacy of con-
sideration was brought up but that was not the con-
trolling factor in the case. 
In Sikes et al. v. Beaver, et al. Sup. Ct. Ga. 157 S.E. 
467 there was no evidence of irregularities or facts 
from which fraud could be drawn, nor does it appear 
that personality was available upon which levy could 
have been made. 
Appellant cites City of Sanford v. Ashton, 131 Fla. 
759; 179 South. 765. Here the court laid down the rule 
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that the judgment debtor was not entitled to cancella-
tion of deed at execution sale after one year following 
the ?sale in the absence of a showing of mistake, accident, 
surprise, misconduct, fraud or irregularity in con-
nection with the judgment, execution or sale. 
In Solomon v. Neubrecht, 300 Mich. 177; 1 N.W. 
(2d) 501 it was held that the sale would not be set aside 
because of inadequacy of consideration where no evi-
dence of any wrongdoing by the creditor or of fraud, 
irregularities or unfairness appeared. 
Lawyers Co-op. Publ. Co. v. Bennett, 34 Fla. 302; 
16 South. 185 is relied upon by appellant. As an example 
of the cases cited by appellant we quote syllabus 3 and 
4 of this case. 
"3. $15.00 is a grossly inadequate price, at a 
public judicial sale, for land worth $350 to $400. 
4. The general rule is that mere inadequacy of 
price alone is not sufficient to set aside a judicial 
sale, but when such inadequacy is connected with 
or shown to result from any mistake, accident, 
surprise, misconduct, fraud or irregularity, the 
sale will generally be set aside." 
The Sellers v. Johnson, 207 Ga. 644; 63 S.E. (2d) 
904 held the pleading not sufficient. 
And in Marr v. Marr, 73 N.J.Eq. 643; 70 Atl. 375 
the evidence was to the effect that the consideration 
paid was for but one-half the value of the property and 
the court held this fact was not such inadequacy as would 
warrant the setting aside the sale. 
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The case of McAlvay v. Consumers Salt Co., 112 Cal. 
App. 383; 297 Pac. 135 involved a sale of stock in a 
corporation, the evidence showed the total number of 
shares issued does not appear and the only direct evi-
dence of the value of the stock in litigation was Stock-
well's testimony that it was worth $150,000.00. As 
against this however, is evidence that the business 
showed a deficit for the year ending June 30, 1925 and 
that the net profits for the following year approximated 
but $2200.00. 
Kauer v. Hertweck, 175 Cal. 278; 165 Pac. 946; 
McLain Land & Investment Co. v. Swofford Bros. Dry 
Goods, 11 Okla. 429; 68 Pac. 502; Dickinson-Keed 
Anderson Co. et al v. Markley, 117 Okla. 17, 244 Pac. 
754; Burton v. Kipp, 30 Mont. 275; 76 Pac. 563; and 
Elliott & Healy v. Wirth, 34 Idaho, 797; 198 Pac. 757 
each held mere inadequacy of price is not sufficient to set 
aside a sale if unaccompanied by elements of fraud, un-
fairness or oppression. 
In Pavlovich v. Watts, 46 Cal. App. 103; 115 Pac. 
(2d) 511, the action involved notes evidencing a claim 
levied on which claim had a face value of $21,000.00 but 
subject to the term of an option and lease agreement so 
that the actual value of the claim levied upon was not 
as great as $21,000, because of the uncertainty of the 
value of the claim it was held that the sale of the claim 
for $250 did not require the sale to be set aside because 
of inadequacy of price paid. 
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And in the Dewey v. Loomis case, 113 Kan. 750; 
216 Pac. 271, it is not shown just what value the 
property had but it was sold for $100 and while it was 
contended that but one bid was made it was evident 
that about 20 persons attended the sale. 
In St. Paul Trust v. Olson, 52 N.D. 315; 202 N.W. 
472 the price was held not inadequate when property 
worth $136,000 was sold for the equivalent of $111,000. 
Raymond v. Halborn, 23 Wis. 57. This case was 
decided in 1868. The property sold consisted of lots 
5 and 6 in Block 1 in City of Racine, the two lots were 
mortgaged by complainant and sold under foreclosure 
as mortgaged, the court found they could have been 
sold separately but having been mortgaged as one there 
was no defect in the sale. 
Coulter v. Meiggs, 58 R.I. 30; 191 Atl. 115 in which 
the court said there was no evidence that the sale in 
one parcel was unjust or inequitable but the court 
further said: 
"This court has approved the principle laid down 
in many cases that a sale enmasse, when less 
would be sufficient, will be declared void, and 
generally it is the duty of the officer to sell by 
parcel and not the whole tract in one entire sale" 
(Italics added) 
The Coulter case supports the contention of 
respondent and is in harmony with the trial court's 
decision in the instant case. 
In Reed v. Gourley, Tex. C.A.; 109 S.W. (2d) 242 
there was no proof whether or not the property was 
sold in bulk or in separate parcels. 
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The cases of Solomon v. Neubrecht and Smith v. 
Randall have heretofore been distinguished. 
In Clark v. Fell, 139 Pa. 469; 22 Atl. 649 there was 
no evidence that personalty was available or that 
sheriff did not attempt to levy on personalty. The court 
said, "the presumption is that a sheriff who has levied 
an execution on real estate without making a return that 
there was no personalty, did his duty and that there 
was no personalty." 
In the instant case deputy sheriff Bleak testified 
to the fact that he made no effort to levy upon 
personalty. 
The case of Jacobsen v. Wigen, 52 Minn. 6; 53 N.W. 
1016 is favorable to respondent and the law therein 
stated is applicable to respondent's case. Under 2 of 
the syllabus we find the following: 
"So an execution sale of real estate where there 
is personal property subject to levy, within the 
knowledge of the execution creditor is not 
absolutely void; but if prejudicial, and especially 
if fraudulent or unconscionable, such sale may 
be set aside or vacated and the proper relief 
may be sought in a suit in equity brought directly 
for such purpose." 
In Bock v. Losekamp, 179 Cal. 674; 179 Pac. 516 the 
purchaser at the sale was not a party to the action but a 
stranger, the judgment debtor knew of the entry of the 
judgment; three futile demands for payment of the judg-
ment were made on the debtor's attorneys. It was not 
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claimed or found that there was any irregularity in the 
proceedings connected with the sale. This case cites and 
distinguishes the earlier California case of Odell v. Cox, 
90 Pac. 194 in which we find 1 of the syllabus reading as 
follows: 
"Though mere inadequacy of price is not suf-
ficient grounds for vacating an execution sale, 
it is a circumstance to be considered in con-
nection with other circumstances. Where prop-
erty worth $2,000 was sold at execution sale to 
the creditor for $26.50, and the execution debtor's 
ignorance of the levy and sale was excusable, the 
sale will be vacated, though statutory notice of 
the sale was given." 
It is most unusual to find a case which so definitely 
supports respondent's contention and the trial court's 
finding as does the Odell v. Cox case supra. 
In Mortimer v. Young, 53 Cal. App. (2d) 317; 127 
Pac. (2d) 950 also cited by appellant under subdivision 
5, we find the case was controlled by section 692a of the 
Code of Civil Procedure of California which requires 
demand for notice of sale to be given, complainant made 
no such demand and could therefore not complain of 
having received no notice. 
IN ANSWER TO 
APPELLANTS TREADWAY'S BRIEF 
Preliminary to respondent's argument to appellants 
Treadway respondent cites: 
66 C. J. 1131, sec. 968. Records—(a) General. 
"Constructive notice arising from the regis-
try of instruments is purely a matter of positive 
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statutory regulation, but registry laws have been 
widely passed, the intention being to do away 
with all notice, other than that given by statute, 
except actual notice in fact. When the statutory 
requirements are substantially complied with, 
subsequent purchasers are charged with con-
structive notice of the record, which is as effect-
ual in law as actual notice. The presumption of 
notice thus raised is conclusive and incontrovert-
ible, and proof of actual notice is dispensed with." 
Sec. 969. Duty of Searching Kecord and 
Bight to Bely Thereon. 
Where titles to real estate are of record, it 
is the duty of a purchaser, in the absence of any 
special agreement, to search the public records 
for himself, and to make a complete examination 
of such records, for such information as they 
may contain regarding the validity of the title 
of the real estate he would purchase. The intend-
ing purchaser is not required to do more than to 
examine the public records in order to ascertain 
the state of the recorded title, and, if he find 
this complete, he can purchase with safety. 
"ABSTBACT. A party is not entitled to 
rely on an abstract but is charged with notice 
of all matters affecting his title which are of 
record." 
Sec. 970. FACTS OF WHICH BECOBD 
IS NOTICE. 
An instrument properly recorded is notice 
of all the facts therein expressly set forth, and 
also of all other material facts which an inquiry 
thereby reasonably suggested would have dis-
closed. (And see long line of cases cited in 
support of this principle.) 
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Sec. 57-3-2 UCA 1953 provides: 
"Every conveyance, or instrument in writing 
affecting real estate, executed, acknowledged or 
proved, and certified, in the manner prescribed 
by this title, and every patent to lands within 
this state duly executed and verified according 
to law, from the time of filing the same with the 
recorder for record, impart notice to all persons 
of the contents thereof; and subsequent pur-
chasers, mortgagees and lienholders shall be 
deemed to purchase and take with notice." 
In the annotation to the above section is found under 
subdivision 5 the case of Crompton v. Jenson, 78 XJ. 55, 
70,1 P. 2d 242 which holds as follows: 
"One who deals with real property is charged 
with notice of what is shown by the records of 
the county recorder of the county in which the 
real property is situated." 
The county records as reflected by the abstract of 
title (Ex. 4) at entries No. 40, 41, 42 and 43 set forth the 
execution, the sheriff's certificate of sale and sheriff's 
deed. The execution reflects that same was issued upon 
a judgment of $22.80 and the sheriff's certificate of sale 
and the sheriff's deed sets forth the nineteen lots, the 
subject of this action, which were purchased at sheriff's 
sale for $47.46. 
I t is clearly evident from the above law and cases 
that appellant Treadways were bound not by simply 
that which appeared in the abstract of title but that 
which appeared of record, and as heretofore pointed out 
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the execution and Sheriff's Deed each recited a con-
sideration as having been paid for 19 lots, of $47.46. 
Attention of the Honorable Court is directed to the 
fact that appellants Treadway willingly paid $1000.00 
for two of the nineteen lots. Such valuation placed on 
the property by these appellants themselves, appellants 
must have assumed the whole of the property to be 
worth not less than $8000.00, which property was pro-
cured for a mere pitance of $47.46. Such would have 
put any person of common reason and prudence on 
inquiry as to the regularity of the proceedings by which 
the party from whom they were acquiring title came into 
title. Not only this but it was evident that the property 
had been sold enmasse, that more than enough property 
had been sold than was necessary to satisfy the judg-
ment, and that personalty was not exhausted before the 
real property was levied upon and sold. 
Recognizing weakness in the title, counsel for 
Treadways did make some investigation as to the regu-
larity of the proceedings leading up to the sale but 
strangely, counsel went to the one who brought about 
the irregularities instead of to the proper source. Is it 
reasonable to expect that the one who must defend the 
title would admit of irregularities 1 
The editors of American Jurisprudence at Vol. 55, 
page 1081, Sec. 703 say: 
"In any event, the law does require reason-
able diligence in ascertaining any defect of title, 
and mere inconvenience will not excuse the fail-
ure to perform this duty. Moreover, the inquiry 
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must be made at a reliable source from which 
the true state of facts mil be naturally disclosed; 
it is not sufficient that the purchaser make an 
inquiry of a person when he knows that it is to 
such person's interest to misrepresent or con-
ceal the existence of the outstanding interest, 
and that such person does deny its existence." 
The Supreme Court of this state is committed to 
the rule that where a recent and immediate grantor's 
deed in a chain of title shows on its face that the grantor 
paid a nominal consideration for the property being con-
veyed it puts the purchaser on notice, and he must 
make an inquiry as to whether or not grantor had a 
right to convey property and whether it was subject to 
other unrecorded and outstanding interests. 
See Lawley et al. vs. Hickenlooper et al., 61 TJ. 298, 
212 Pac. 526. 
Respondent is mindful of the fact that subsequent 
to the Lawley vs. Hickenlooper case the Legislature has 
passed a statute, Chapter 106, 1945 Session Laws, which 
provides that a nominal consideration in the deed is no 
longer notice of outstanding equitable interests. 
In Pender v. Bird, (Utah) 224 P2d 1057 this court 
had occassion to consider a transfer of title predicated 
on a quit claim deed to property of considerable value 
when a consideration of $25 was paid for the deed and 
in which case Mr. Justice McDonough, speaking for the 
court, said: 
"The (recording) statute was not enacted 
to protect one whose ignorance of the title is 
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deliberate and intentional, nor does a mere nomi-
nal consideration satisfy the requirements that 
a valuable consideration must be paid" (Itallics 
added) 
We believe it was not the intention of the legis-
ture to make Chapter 106 applicable to those transfers in 
which the instrument reflects and is intended to reflect 
the actual consideration, such as a sheriff's deed. We 
contend that the statute covers voluntary conveyances 
in which actual consideration is not expressed and not 
non-voluntary conveyances in which true consideration 
is expressed. 
In the case of Hart v. Parrish, 244 S.W. (2d) 105, 
supra the Supreme Court of Missouri held that a sub-
sequent grantee in the immediate chain of title was not 
an innocent purchaser where the Sheriff's deed recited 
a consideration of $37.50 and the property had a value of 
$3500.00, the court said: 
"When the deed of trust was executed August 
23rd, 1948, defendant-appellant Mittler, bene-
ficiary in the deed of trust, had constructive 
notice of the sheriff's deed priorly recorded 
August 20th, 1948, Sec. 442.390, E.S. 1949. The 
recorded deed recited a consideration of $37.50. 
The described proprty was admittedly of the 
fair market value of $3500.00. Defendant, cross-
appellant Mittler had inspected the property 
sometime in July 1948. He testified, 'I know 
property when I see it.' Mittler testified he had 
made the loan to plaintiffs on August 14th, at 
which time he 'did not know who owned the 
property.' He said: 'when you make a loan to 
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a man who is a friend of yours you loan him 
money of his face if necessary.' Appellant 
Mittler testified he was depending on plaintiff 
Hart's 'knowledge of the transaction,' and upon 
Hart's judgment as to the title. Plaintiff was 
familiar with the property and knew defendant-
respondent Lillian Parrish, widow of Charles H. 
Parrish, was in possession, 'living on the prop-
erty'. In these circumstances it should not be 
held Mittler had no notice of the sale upon which 
defendant, Lillian Parrish, had relied for cancel-
lation." 
This appellant also argues as does appellant Dowse 
that the sale was not void, but voidable only. We have 
fully answered this argument under the Dowse section 
of this brief. 
Appellant Treadway takes the position that he 
obtained from Dowse a better title and a stronger posi-
tion as to respondent than Dowse enjoyed. This is not 
the law for it has been repeatedly held that a judgment 
creditor who purchases at his execution sale is not a 
bona fide purchase, and that he is chargeable as a matter 
of law with notice of all irregularities attending the 
execution and sale. 
Simons vs. Clark, 99 Pac. 739; 
Hazelwood v. Jenkins, 205 Pac. 1038; 
Kuehn v. Kuehn, 259 S.W. 290; 
Anderson Buick Co. v. Cook, 110 P2d 857; 
Tallyn v. Cowden, 290 Pac. 1005; 
Badin v. Henry McCleary Timber Co., 289; 
Pac. 1016; 
Bradt v. Beloit Dary Co., 230 N.W. 135. 
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Thus it follows as a corollary to this doctrine that 
one taking title through a judgment creditor who 
purchased at the execution sale is not a bona fide 
purchaser. In support of this position we cite 33 C.J.S. 
Sec. 296 at page 589 reading as follows: 
"Purchasers from judgment creditor. If a 
judgment creditor purchasing at an execution 
sale is not regarded as a bona fide purchaser, 
(Sec. 295), a party claiming under such judgment 
creditor is not an innocent purchaser, and ac-
quires no better title than that of the judgment 
creditor, at least where he has notice of facts 
placing him on inquiry." 
The record affecting the property being purchasd 
by appellants Treadwavs did disclose the amount of 
property acquired at sheriff's sale, the price for which 
it was acquired and the fact that the property was not 
contiguous and further the fact that more than enough 
property to satisfy the amount of the judgment was 
sold under execution. 
SPECIAL WABBANTY DEED 
It is further respondent's contention that appellants 
Tread way were not bona fide purchasers without notice, 
this inasmuch as tEese appellants accepted a special 
warranty deed and did not insist on a general warranty 
deed. The special warranty deed put Treadways on 
notice of the fact that appellant Dowse was conveying 
only such right, title and interest as he himself had in 
and to the premises. The special warranty deed was 
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accepted notwithstanding the fact that appellant Dowse 
had agreed to convey the property to Treadways by a ^ 
general warranty deed. 
Although the authorities are not in harmony, the 
general rule appears to be that where a grantor gives a 
special warranty deed conveying all his right, title and 
interest it puts the purchaser on notice of infirmities 
in the title, this is especially true under the circumstances 
of this case. 
In QQ C J . at page 1098 the law is stated as follows: 
"A purchaser need not claim under a general 
warranty deed to entitle him to the defense of 
bona fide purchaser, if the deed purports to 
convey the land itself and not merely the 
grantor's title or interest therein, and the fact 
that it contains a limited or special warranty, or 
no waranty at all, cannot of itself impute notice 
of prior or lateral equities, so as to preclude one 
claiming under such a deed from being a bona 
fide purchaser, although, on the other hand, it 
has beeen held that a deed with only a special 
covenant of warranty raises a presumption of 
knowledge by the grantee that the title is defec-
tive. But one who takes property under a deed 
containing an express exclusion of warranty of 
title, and as to which there is a complete chain 
of title, to another on record, is not a bona fide 
purchaser." (Itallics added). 
Thus it appears that that which the record title 
reflected, namely, that the gross lack of consideration, 
sale enmasse of 19 lots which consisted of three separate 
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parcels, more than sufficient property sold than neces-
sary to satisfy the judgment, the sheriff's return failing 
to show that personalty was exhausted before levying 
upon the real property, the excessive levy and the 
failure of appellant Dowse to convey title by a general 
~ warranty deed as he had agreed, most certainly placed 
Treadways on notice of irregularities and defects and 
he cannot now claim to be a bona fide purchaser. 
Having made an investigation and having recognized 
infirmities, inadequacy of price and irregularities, 
these appellants cannot now say they were innocent pur-
chasers for value. 
IN ANSWER TO APPELLANT WHITAKER'S 
BRIEF 
A complete answer to the arguments and contentions 
of appellant Whitaker is heretofore set forth. 
I t should be remembered that appellants Whitaker 
and Dowse were close friends and had been for a long 
period of time, that they visited each other at least once 
each week, that they had had numerous business trans-
actions, both prior to the time the mortgage was placed 
on the corner lots and subsequent thereto. That at the 
time the mortgage was given and When the foreclosure 
thereof was instituted they were jointly interested in 
several properties in Salt Lake County. 
The fact that appellant Dowse permitted the interest 
on the mortgage to become delinquent and to permit 
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the foreclosure of the mortgage covering the corner lot 
which has a value without contradiction of at least $6,-
000.00 as was testified to by Mr. LeCheminant, risking 
the total loss of the property mortgaged, without any ap-
parent effort on the part of appellant Dowse to so much 
as pay the interest is the clearest evidence of collusion 
on the part of Dowse and Whitaker. 
It is further evident that as a part of the connivance 
they obtained title insurance on the property in an 
amount necessary to cover the mortgage. This of course 
does not excuse the title company for having issued the 
policy in the face of all that appeared of record, but it 
does go to show that it is all part of a well planned 
scheme of these two appellants to protect their every 
move in the transaction. 
It is further clearly evident that little time was lost 
by appellant Dowse in placing a mortgage on the corner 
property after having acquired the sheriff's deed thereto. 
Does Mr. Whitaker expect the court to believe if this were 
a bona fide transaction in all respects that Mr. Dowse 
would permit a foreclosure of the mortgage to be entered 
when but two interest installments were due and owing 
thereon? In such cases where fraud is so apparent, the 
trial court was not bound by that which appeared on the 
record alone but it is within the discretionary power of 
the court to look behind the evidence and to determine 
that which is at the very foundation of the fraudulent ^ 
acts of the parties. ? 
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This appellant in setting out the status of the title 
to the nineteen lots executed upon, urges on this court 
as he did in the trial court that Lots 13 to 21, Block 8, 
were subject to a lien of judgment in favor of Carl Mor-
andi for $3,086.44 (Ex. C). It is evident that no money 
judgment lien stood against respondent in favor of Carl 
Morandi as appellant would have this court believe, 
but the same was a judgment in favor of respondent and 
against Morandi quieting title in respondent to certain 
property therein described, subject to the payment by 
respondent to Morandi of taxes, interest, penalty and 
costs in the sum of $3,086.44. Judge Neely, counsel for 
Morandi, testified to the fact that it was never intended 
that a judgment be entered against respondent in favor 
of Morandi. By this same kind of argument at the trial 
of the case appellant attempted to depreciate the value 
of respondent's interest in the properties executed upon 
and sold at sheriff's sale. 
The evidence in this case very clearly shows that 
appellant Whitaker is not a bona fide mortgagee for value 
without notice of title defects, but on the contrary it is 
evident that this appellant was a party to the fraud per-
petrated on respondent. 
STABILITY OF LAND TITLE DEEIVED 
THEOUGH JUDICIAL PEOCESS 
It is believed the case of Dunn v. Ponceler, 193 So. 
723, 236 Ala. 53, completely answers the appellant's 
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argument that the stability and marketability of real 
property requires a reversal of the trial court's decision. 
In the Dunn case the court said: 
"What was said by Brickell, C. J., in Ray's 
Adm'r. v. Womble, Supra, is here pertinent and 
settles this question adversely to the contention 
of appellant. 'While it is the policy of the law 
to protect purchasers at judicial sales and to 
inspire confidence in their validity, it is equally 
its policy to prevent such sales from being per-
petrated into instrumntalities of oppression and 
confiscation of men's estates. It was the clear 
duty of the sheriff in which he would have been 
fully protected, to have postponed the sale, 
returning the execution, stating the facts and that 
the lands had not been sold for want of bidders.' 
Powell v. Governor, 9 Ala. 36; Lankford v. Jack-
son, 21 Ala. 650; Henderson vs. Sublett, 21 Ala. 
626. The sale, under the facts appearing in the 
record were mere spoliation and not the execu-
tion of the process of the court. There can be 
no hesitancy in pronouncing it invalid and decree-
ing its vacation and a cancellation of the deed 
of the sheriff." 
CROSS-APPEAL 
(1) The court erred in awarding punitive damages 
in the sum of $500.00 only in respondent's claim for 
slander of title. 
(2) The court erred in allowing respondent the sum 
of $1,000.00 attorney's fee only under his claim for 
slander of title. 
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AKGUMENT 
The court having found that the appellant Dowse 
had executed upon and sold respondent's property upon 
a satisfied judgment, it decreed a judgment slander of 
title holding that appellant Dowse had intentionally and 
maliciously slandered respondent's title to his property. 
For this the court awarded but the sum of $500.00 puni-
tive damages and $1,000.00 attorney's fees. 
We submit that under the circumstances of this case 
that the punitive damages awarded should have been 
not less than $2500.00. 
The uncontradicted evidence was that a reasonable 
attorney's fees incurred in this action for slander of 
title was $1500.00, however the trial court awarded only 
the sum of $1,000.00. 
Eespondent therefore respectfully submits that the 
trial court erred in setting punitive damages in the sum 
of $500.00 and attorneys' fees in the sum of $1,000.00 
and respondent respectfully requests that this court 
enter a mandate requiring the trial court to enter puni-
tive and exemplary damages in the sum of $2500.00 and 
attorneys' fees in the sum of $1500.00 in the slander 
of title of respondent. 
WHEKEFORE, respondent respectfully submits: 
That the judgment of the trial court vacating and 
setting aside the sheriff's deed to the appellant Dowse 
and the deed of the appellant Dowse to the appellant's 
Treadfway and the mortgage be sustained and that a 
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mandate be issued from this court ordering the trial 
court to modify the judgment in the slander of title action 
setting the respondent's punitive and exemplary dam-
ages in the sum of $2500.00 and $1500.00 attorneys' fees. 
Respectfully submitted, 
L. DELOS DAINES, 
MILTON V. BACKMAN of 
Backman, Backman & Clark, 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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